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A JUDGE JUDGES JUDGES*
ARMISTEAD M. DOBIEt
It is indeed a gladness and a joy for me to be privileged to
speak at this time, in this presence and on this occasion. When
I was a young lawyer here in St. Louis, at the beginning of this
century, Tyrrell Williams and I became good friends and I
formed a deep admiration for him as a man, a lawyer, a teacher
and a dean. Altogether fitting is it that a memorial lectureship
should be established to commemorate his loyal and distinguished
service to the Law School of Washington University.
The story is told of the Greek painter Appelles that a shoe-
maker criticized the painting of a shoe in one of the master's
pictures. Appelles, recognizing the technical knowledge of shoes
possessed by a shoemaker, made the suggested change. The em-
boldened shoemaker then began to criticize other features of the
picture, whereupon he was sternly bidden by Appelles to stick to
his last. Now, by the kindness of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the
charity of the United States Senate, and the grace of God, I am
a judge. And I shall obey the injunction of Appelles by sticking
to my last.
To my lecture this morning, I have given the somewhat cryptic
title, "A Judge Judges Judges." This I have done not with the
idea of lending to my scattered remarks an adventitious dignity
they would not otherwise possess, but merely because those elu-
sive spirits, custom and convention, require that we christen
even children of the brain.
If judges are to be judged, they would doubtless prefer to be
judged by judges, whose critical judgments on their brothers are
certainly tempered by sympathy and founded in experience. And
* Tyrrell Williams Memorial Lecture, delivered before the School of Law
of Washington University, May 2, 1951.
t United States Circuit Judge for the Fourth Circuit.
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I have little sympathy with the attitude of some judges who ap-
pear to resent any criticism of their judicial acts. Judges inhabit
no ivory tower; they sit upon no holy hill. On the contrary, they
are of, for and by the people and should welcome any criticism,
provided only it be fair and intelligent. Said Chief Justice Taft
in an address before the Judicial Section of the American Bar
Association:
Judges are men and are not so keenly charged with the
duty of constant labor that the stimulus of an annual inquiry
into what they are doing may not be helpful. With such mild
visitation they are likely to cooperate much more readily in
an organized effort to get rid of business and do justice.
Criticizing judges has long been, and will doubtless remain, a
popular indoor sport. My own feeling is not that of a young
matron who, when asked if she liked indoor sports, promptly re-
plied "I did till I married one."
On the other hand, judges very properly resent criticisms of
the prejudiced, the uninformed and the unintelligent, which have
no basis in either fairness or fact.' And particularly is this true,
when a disgruntled lawyer who has lost a case is too prone, in an
attempt to explain his lack of success to a client, to resort to
vilification of the judge.
My viewpoint must be that of one on the inside looking out.
Time does not permit my approach to be historical; I shall try
not to make it hysterical. Since many within sound of my voice
(which includes rather a wide area) are not versed in the lore
and language of the law, I shall not be technical, and, as I believe
in safe and sane celebrations, I shall use my utmost endeavor not
to be pyrotechnical.
1. See, for example, an utterly unfair (but very widely read) article
Behind the Black Robes by Howard Whitman, in the February 1948 number
of The Woman's Home Companion, which begins:
On the benches of America, along with our wise judges, our learnedjudges and our Solomons, we have a shocking-almost unbelievable-
number of incompetents, idlers, tyrants, political hacks, knaves and
bunglers. Some of our judges are so unfit they rely on secretaries and
hangers-on to write their decisions. Some sleep on the bench. Some
are alcoholics. Some are such miserable administrators no business
firm in the country would tolerate them.
Minority though they are, such judges are a repugnant blemish
on the face of justice. They have hidden too long behind the black
robe and the awesome aura of 'Your Honor' and 'If it please the
Court.' They are a disgrace to your able righteous judges. And more
important, they are a menace to Vour 7ights as a citizen.
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The origin of the office and title of judge is lost in the mists
of time; many people doubtless hope it will never be found.
Always the title has been one of dignity and importance. The
ancient Israelites, as one of the highest attributes of God, were
fond of describing God as "Judge of all the earth."' 2 Certainly
that effectively disposes of all questions of jurisdiction.
And as you well know, the seventh book of the Old Testament
is the Book of Judges, which contains many interesting items
about the early judges of Israel. To me one of the most interest-
ing of items is the fact that the Fourth Judge of Israel was a
woman by the name of Deborah. According to the scriptural
narrative, she was not only an excellent judge, but also a song-
stress and a prophetess.3 We are not told that her judicial utter-
ances were in song, so captious critics cannot speculate whether
her juristic notes in the middle register were round and clear or
whether her legislative judgments were sometimes off-key. One
cannot help wondering, were Deborah alive today, whether, in
her role of prophetess, she could foretell what would be the
decision of the United States Supreme Court on a pending case,
and how many Justices of that great Court would dissent, how
many would concur.
There are, so the judges themselves tell us, many classifica-
tions of judges. Thus, on the basis (or fundamentum divisionis)
of direction, judges are divided into judges ad quem, to whom a
case comes, and judges a quo from whom a case goes. I strongly
suspect there is an omitted class on this score (or tertium quid
as the logicians say) -those judges who do not know where they
are going but are on their way.
Perhaps the most important practical classification of judges
divides them into trial judges and appellate judges,4 whose func-
tions are quite different. The trial judge (sometimes alone, some-
times with the aid of a jury, a referee, a master or a commis-
sioner) actually tries the cases. His may be called the worm's-eye
viewpoint, from the bottom looking up. The appellate judge
2. See GENESIS, ch. 18, v. 25; DEUTERONOMY, ch. 32, v. 36; PSALMS,
ch. 92, v. 4.
3. JUDGES, chapters 4 and 5.
4. It is interesting to note that in the federal judicial system, the
District Court (with a few unimportant exceptions) exercises only original
jurisdiction; the United States Court of Appeals has only appellatejurisdiction; the United States Supreme Court is given both original and
appellate jurisdiction.
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really tries the trial judge's conduct of the case, so the appellate
judge's viewpoint might be described as the bird's-eye viewpoint,
from the top looking down.
I have myself been both a trial judge and an appellate judge.
Without hesitation, I express the opinion that the trial judge is
the more practically important of the two. He it is that brings
justice home to the public; he is the one with whom the people
are thrown into contact and whom they know. From him, in
large measure, is derived the popular conception of the admin-
istration of justice. His must be the power, in many instances
without the aid of elaborate argument or written brief, of quick
and accurate decision on points of law which he could not pos-
sibly have foreseen. His is the dramatic role in the comedy or
tragedy of the law. The cases before him are in truth legion; by
comparison, only a small majority of his cases ever reach an ap-
pellate court.
Here in these United States, an anomalous but fundamental
classification divides our judges into state judges and federal
judges. It is indeed difficult to explain to a layman the distinc-
tions and differences between the two systems of courts; yet
these distinctions, as to both jurisdictionG and procedure5 are
many, varied and important.7 Federal judges are appointed for
5. In some instances, the jurisdiction of state and federal courts is
concurrent; in others, the jurisdiction of one system is exclusive of the
other.
6. Procedure in the District Courts of the United States is governed,
on the civil side by the FFDAL RULES OF CIVL PROCEURE, on the criminal
side, by the FEDERAL RuLus OF CRIINAL PROCEDURE.
7. In any Utopian political state there would be a single system of
courts to administer the laws of that state, and, further, simplicity in
that one organization would be the substance of things to be hoped
for, judicially. With two systems of courts must almost inevitably
come some indescribable confusion, some unfortunate uncertainty in
the legal order. If the jurisdiction of the two systems be rigidly
exclusive, each of the other, regrettable waste of preliminary effort
ensues, when the litigant must determine which of the two systemsis the proper one for his suit, the amount of that waste depending
on how sharply and how clearly the lines of cleavage are drawn
between the jurisdictions of those systems. If the jurisdiction of the
two systems be (totally or partially) concurrent, the even unhappier
spectacle is presented of a litigant winning in one system when he
would (or might) have lost in the other (or vice versa), with more
or less contempt, primarily for the state in which such a situation
can exist, secondarily for the judicial organization which makes
uncertainty as to the nature and extent of legal rights an integral
part of its functioning.
The fathers of the Constitution, however, saw clearly (and the
results seem amply to have vindicated their wisdom) that, without
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life by the President of the United States, subject to confirmation
by the Senate, and the average salary of a federal judge is far
in excess of that paid to his brethren on state courts. Compar-
isons, though perhaps odious, are none the less interesting. It is
my own belief ( though I admit to being a prejudiced witness)
that, in the main, federal judges, on the scores of competence
and distinction, compare more than favorably with state judges.
With more confidence, I express the view that the federal courts
tend more and more to acquire jurisdiction of the most important
and the most far-reaching cases which American courts are
called upon to decide.
Oddly enough, a fact familiar to lawyers but not to laymen, the
powers of a judge are conditioned and limited by time and place.
A judge may do a number of things in open court8 which he may
not do in his chambers; while a judicial step, proper in the
earlier procedural stages of a case, cannot be taken at a later
stage of the case.,
It has always seemed passing strange to me how badly the
judge has fared in song and story. Poems, plays, novels, stories
-all have been written for the glorification, sometimes almost
the apotheosis, of the doctor, the priest and the teacher. Not so
with the poor old judge. Usually he is held in fiction as either a
vindictive tyrant, a fatuous ass, or (as is too current in Amer-
ican screen plays) as a stooge or middleman to give point and
pith to the jokes of the handsome young district attorney or the
lovely girl on trial before him. Notable exceptions in modern
American fiction are Irvin Cobb's lovable Judge Priest and
a federal judicial branch of the government, the Constitution, laws
and treaties of the United States might indeed prove a futile 'supreme
law of the land.' A supreme federal government, with its powers
enumerated in a written Constitution, seemed to connote an entirely
separate federal judiciary with power to pass finally on the nature
and extent of those powers. One almost instinctively shudders at
what might have been had the Constitution been turned over to the
tender interpretative mercies of the courts of the states, or even to
the final decisions of any system of courts, other than a federal
system created by that very instrument itself. DOBIE, FEDERAL PRO-
CEDupx, 2, 3 (1928).
8. Thus Rule 18 of the FEDERAL Ruins Or CRImiNAL PROcEDUR begins
with these words: "Arraignment shall be conducted in open court."
9. It is, of course, true, too, that certain objections by counsel must
be seasonably made. Thus, under Rule 51 of the FEDERAL RULEs OF CIVIL
PRocEDURE: "No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to
give an instruction [by the judge] unless he objects thereto before the
jury retires to consider its verdict."
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Melville Davisson Post's Judge Braxton; but the activities for
which these two are extolled are quite extra-judicial.
Thus in Pope's Rapoe of the Lock, we find:
The hungry judges soon the sentence sign,
And wretches hang that jurymen may dine.
The best that Shakespeare could do in As You Like It was to de-
scribe the justice "in fair round belly with good capon lined."
Dickens is even more bitter. Everyone remembers the intermin-
able suit of Jarndyce v. Jarndyce in Bleak House, to say nothing
of the scathingly clever account of the great case of Bardell v.
Pickwick, in which Mr. Justice Stareleigh, ably assisted by those
mendacious mountebanks, Sergeant Buzfuz and Sergeant Snub-
bin, gives an excellent example of how to dispense with justice.
Arthur Train, in one of his charming stories about the delect-
able Mr. Tutt, thus describes Judge Rufus Bunbury:
The Honorable Rufus, on the other hand, looked exactly
like a judge. He was fifty-one years old, portly, with a clean
shaven, rather flabby face, pale blue eyes and an impressive
dome streaked with thin gray hair and dotted with liver
spots.... Judge Bunbury knew he was not an admirable
person, but, being a pragmatist, whenever his conscience
reared its head, he pushed it gently down.
If this be an accurate description, who, I ask you, would want
to look "exactly like a judge?" Since when has it been charac-
teristic of a judge that his liver is unacquainted with the func-
tional approach? To one, then, whose ideas of the typical judge
are gleaned from modern fiction, the judge must be classed as a
periodic pest, in the same category as the boll weevil, the seven
year locust and the after dinner speaker.
The Honorable Joseph C. Hutcheson, Chief Judge of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, my col-
league and distant cousin (he lives in Texas and I live in Vir-
ginia) gives us, on a very high plane, this picture:
If you ask me what is the prime requisite of the ideal
judge, I must tell you that it is faith. If you ask me, faith in
what, I must tell you faith in the natural law principles
upon which our freedom depends, faith in the rights of man,
faith in the constitution which declares and in the constitu-
tional way of life which protects them, faith in law as liber-
ator, faith in the justice of the general will, faith in the
American way of life, faith, in short, in the principles and
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practices which in Madison's immortal phrase 'enable the
government to control the governed, yet also oblige it to con-
trol itself.'
From the Canons of Judicial Ethics of the American Bar As-
sociation, I quote:
What a Judge Should Be
In every particular his conduct should be above reproach.
He should be conscientious, studious, thorough, courteous,
patient, punctual, just, impartial, fearless of public clamor,
regardless of public praise, and indifferent to private polit-
ical or partisan influences; he should administer justice ac-
cording to law, and deal with his appointments as a public
trust; he should not allow other affairs or his private inter-
ests to interfere with the prompt and proper performance
of his judicial duties, nor should he administer the office for
the purpose of advancing his personal ambitions or increas-
ing his popularity.
Certainly, any judge who fully, fairly and freely lives up to
these Canons, deserves well of the Commonwealth. Indeed, to
go further, he seems assured of a golden crown and a celestial
harp in that far-off land, where "beyond these voices there is
peace." Or, to put it another way, we shall find the ideal judge
if, as and when there is combined in a single person the strength
of Samson, the patience of Job, the wisdom of Solomon, the
statesmanship of Marshall, the economic foresight of Mansfield,
the political acumen of Machiavelli, the trenchant pen of Holmes
and the nervous system of William J. Bryan.
This brings me to a brief discussion of what manner of judge
has brought the bench into disrepute. Obviously, the worst of-
fender is the corrupt and venal judge, who has sullied the ermine
by betraying a high trust for his personal gain. No punishment,
short of death, is too severe for him, but fortunately such judges
have been very few and exceedingly far between.
Popular clamor has justly been directed at two other types of
judges. The first of these is the pompous and arbitrary judge.
He regards himself not as a minister in the temple of justice,
rather as justice personified. On the bench, he knows nothing of
courtesy or consideration for others. He rides rough-shod over
other officers of the court, clerks, marshals, referees and commis-
sioners; they are merely dust beneath his judicial feet and shine,
when permitted to shine at all, only in the glory reflected from
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him. Lawyers, jurors and witnesses merit only moderate con-
tempt from the judicial stuffed shirt. It is a common argument
against judicial life tenure that it tends to breed such judges.
Far more common than the corrupt judge or the arbitrary
judge, and far more detrimental to the efficient administration
of justice is the lazy judge, who seldom lets his manifest duty
interfere with either his private pleasure or his personal con-
venience. He is the sand in the judicial gear-box. His theme-song
appears to be "Please go way and let me sleep;" his motto,
"Never do today what you can put off till tomorrow." True it is
that a court cannot be run along the lines of a retail grocery
store, yet almost any business would be wrecked if those in
charge pursued the dilatory tactics of the procrastinating
judge.10 The public here has been long suffering and of great ten-
derness, and much of the blame must fall on the lawyers who
have aided and abetted in the perpetuation of this needless nui-
sance. Every judge knows the lawyer whose chief stock-in-trade
seems to be a perpetual desire for an eternal continuance.
I am glad to state that in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit, of which I am proud to be a member, the
average time for the disposal of a case, after argument and sub-
mission is measured in weeks, not years or even months. No
fixed limit is set beforehand to the length of each regular term
of court ;11 we sit as long as is necessary to hear every case on the
docket. 12 We emulate the example of our brethren of the British
Privy Council by deciding cases utterly lacking in merit before
we rise from the bench. And I heartily recommend to my appel-
10. In the federal judicial system, the Circuit Judges of each Circuit
constitute a Judicial Council, charged with expediting the work of the
federal courts in the Circuit. In my own Circuit, the Fourth, we have
found occasions in a few instances to use this power very effectively.
Similar expediting machinery is a crying need for the courts of our States.
11. When occasion demands, we hold special terms for the prompt
disposition of important cases. Thus we held a special term recently in
Baltimore, the most convenient city in the Circuit for the lawyers. A
decision was reached and announced to the lawyers just one hour after the
conclusion of the arguments.
12. Many United States Courts of Appeals sit regularly only in a
single city. Thus, in the First Circuit, the Court sits only in Boston; in
the Second Circuit, the Court sits only in New York; in the Third Circuit,
the Court sits only in Philadelphia. Others of these courts are migratory.
Thus, our Court sits each year in Richmond, Baltimore, Charlotte and
Asheville. This is a bit hard on the judges but it is a great convenience
to lawyers and it has the added advantage of bringing a federal appellate
court to the attention of the people in many places within the Circuit.
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late brethren our practice of frequently writing a very brief
per curiam opinion when a case is quite devoid of legal conse-
quence.
A good deal has been written and said about the judicial
mind.13 Much of it seems to me, in the language of Hamlet,
"Words, words, words." If by the term judicial mind is meant
that, in his mental processes, the judge works in thought-tight
compartments, entirely oblivious of what is going on in the
workaday world outside, then I think as the old Negro said
when he first saw a giraffe: "There ain't no such animal." A
man becomes no less a man when he dons the black robe; the
more of a man he remains, the better is he as a judge.
Any experience, I care not what its character or calibre, which
extends a man's mental horizon, broadens his social philosophy
and deepens his humility and sympathy, is that much gain for a
judge just as it is for any individual charged with the responsi-
bility of making decisions affecting human beings. And this is
none the less true, though the approach of a judge to his prob-
lems, and the precise technique he employs in their solution,
must and do differ from the approach and technique of other
professions, such as pure science or medicine.
The job of the judge, and it is difficult to imagine a more im-
portant one, is to resolve human conflicts in the administration
of justice under the law. This is not as simple as it sounds and
seems. It is "of the essence of the law to be always torn between
the ideal and the actual, the permanent and the changing, the
right and the necessary, the general principle and the concrete
case." The theoretical internal coherence of law must often
give way to practical external flexibility.
When these factors clash, as often they must and do, it is for
the judge to hold the scales and to decide in favor of the one and
against the other. 5 That is a difficult, delicate and dangerous
13. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1928) is a classic
in this field. See also, EMERY, CONCERNING JUSTICE (1914); JUDSON, THE
JUDICIARY AND THE PEOPLE, (1913).
14. This quotation, and a large part of the analysis of this and the suc-
ceeding paragraph, are taken from an excellent article by Professor
Iredell Jenkins, Chairman of the Department of Philosophy at the Uni-
versity of Alabama, The Role of Ethical Values in Legal Decisions, 12
OHIO ST. L. J. 36 (1951).
15. In the article just quoted (Id. at 43), Professor Jenkins writes:
The literature of jurisprudence is replete with studies of problems
where the law is torn between competing forces, or is made to choose
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task. The judge must deal with human imperfections, with ir-
reconcilable tensions, with hostile interests, with continually
changing environmental conditions. And all of these are as
many and as varied as the Miltonian leaves that "strewed the
brooks of Vallembrosa."
Many jurists have envisaged a perfect legal order, with a per-
manent and all embracing code that can adjust with mathemat-
ical precision and complete justice all individual differences,
without any resulting friction. That is a Utopian dream. Life is
too complex, too rich, too imaginative, ever to be confined in a
juristic straight-jacket or a Procrustean bed. There never has
been, and there never will be, a judge worthy of his salt who can
be classified as a cold and clammy thinking machine."" No judge,
however he may try, can, in his decisions, completely and effec-
tively divorce himself from what he has seen, has heard, has ex-
perienced and has been. He is like the man who met a friend who
gave every appearance of deep sorrow. Said the man to the
friend: "What on earth is the matter with you?" Replied the
dejected friend: "I've just lost my mother-in-law and that is
very hard." "Hard," rejoined the man, "I've found it impossible."
May I illustrate one phase of this discussion (the clash of law
and morality)'17 with two actual cases: Olef v. Holdap,18 decided
by the Supreme Court of Ohio, and Scarborough v. Atlantic
Coast Line Ry. Co.,19 decided by the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit Court?
In the Olef case, an uncle and a nephew had a joint bank ac-
count, so that either could at any time draw out the full account.
The nephew murdered the uncle. Was the nephew entitled to the
account? Under a technical rule of law, upon the death of one
of the owners of a joint bank account, the survivor takes the ac-
count. On the other hand, it is a great equitable principle, based
on morality, that no one should profit by his own wrong, and the
wrong here was a brutal and sordid murder. The Supreme
Court of Ohio awarded the account to the nephew, stating that
between competing goals. In fact, one is justified in saying that
every general theory of law, and every analysis of special legal
problems, culminates in a dilemma; law always seems called upon to
meet demands that are contradictory.
16. See Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 CoL. L. Rav. 605 (1908).
17. See Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HAnv. L. REV. 97 (1908).
18. 129 Ohio St. 432, 195 N. E. 838 (1935).
19. 178 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 919 (1950).
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situation was covered by a precise rule of law establishing legal
relations and the concrete rights arising therefrom; that a judge
should not upset these actual constancies in the name of extra-
legal principles of morality.2 One judge dissented. Said the
judge writing the majority opinion:
Property cannot be taken from an individual who is legally
entitled to it because he violates a public policy. Property
rights are too sacred to be subjected to a danger of this
character. We are a court of law, not a theological institu-
tion. [Italics added]' 1
Said the dissenting judge:
It is a natural revulsion that arises on being compelled byjudicial decree to assure to a murderer the fruits of his
crime.... It is always hard to be forced to sacrifice the right
for the sake of a syllogism.... Reason and authority sustain
the conclusion that the murderer cannot recover the amount
of the deposit.'
In the Scarborough case, a rascally claim agent of the railroad
induced an ignorant and unsuspecting boy to delay a suit against
the railroad until the expiration of the period prescribed in the
statute of limitations. The claim agent, in the guise of a friend,
told the boy that the claim agent would secure a handsome sum
of money for the boy and warned the boy against seeking outside
advice or hiring a lawyer. The question was whether the agent's
fraud stopped the running of the statute of limitations. This
statute was what lawyers call a substantive rather than a reme-
dial statute. The weight of judicial authority was that while
20. See CAmzozo, THE NATrURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 40-41 (1928):
Let me take as an illustration of such conflict the famous case
of Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506. That case decided that a legatee
who had murdered his testator would not be permitted by a court
of equity to enjoy the benefits of the will. Conflicting principles were
there in competition for the mastery. One of them prevailed, and
vanquished all the others. There was the principle of the binding
force of a will disposing of the estate of a testator in conformity
with law. That principle, pushed to the limit of its logic, seemed
to uphold the title of the murderer. There was the principle that
civil courts may not add to the pains and penalties of crimes. That,
pushed to the limit of its logic, seemed again to uphold his title.
But over against these was another principle, of greater generality,
its roots deeply fastened in universal sentiments of justice, the princi-
ple that no man should profit from his own inequity or take advantage
of his own wrong. The logic of this principle prevailed over the logic
of the others.
21. Olef v. Holdap, 129 Ohio St. 432, 438, 195 N.E. 838, 841 (1935).
22. Id. at 447, 195 N.E. at 844.
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
fraud would stop the running of the remedial statute, fraud
would not (and could not) have that effect on the substantive
statute. The court held unanimously in favor of the boy. From
the opinion I quote:
The ancient maxim that no one should profit by his con-
scious wrong is too deeply imbedded in the frame-work of
our law to be set aside by a legislative distinction between
the closely related statutes of limitations. Here the proper
approach is not, technical and conceptualistic. Rather, we
think it should be realistic and humane. The spirit, not the
letter, should control.
I wish there were time to discuss at some length these two
cases, in which two courts reached diametrically opposed conclu-
sions, when in each case a rock-ribbed rule of technical law ran
head-on into a generally recognized principle of universal moral-
ity. Much can be said, and much has been said, on this problem
which is neither new nor unique and has as many facets as a dia-
mond. It has often been before the United States Supreme Court,
with varying results (frequently by a closely divided Court),
notably in the Minimum Wage Case,24 the Shoshone Indians
Land Case25 and the cases involving compulsory salutes to our
flag by a religious group known as Jehovah's Witnesses."
Certainly I do not attempt to offer any complete or universal
solution, if any there be, to so complex a problem. I simply
close this part of my discussion by telling you that the judge who
wrote the Scarborough opinion, where fraud, like the villain in
the old time melodrama, met with utter defeat, is the lecturer
who stands before you this morning.2 7
And now, as Walter Winchell is wont to say, I must beat the
red hand around the clock. Speaking for myself, I find my job
as a federal appellate judge delightful, vivid and even romantic.
23. Scarborough v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 178 F.2d 253, 259 (1949).
24. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Adkins
v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
25. Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S.
335 (1945).
26. See West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943), overruling Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S.
586 (1940).
27. For excellent discussions of many of the cases cited in the preceding
notes, see Brown, A Scholastic Critique of Case Law, 12 Oio ST. L. J. 14(1951); Cohen, Judicial Ethics, 12 Onio ST. L. J. 3 (1951); Hartman,
Value Analysis of Legal Decisions, 12 OHio ST. L. J. 23 (1951); Jenkins,
The Role of Ethical Values in Legal Decisions, 12 OHio ST. L. J. 36 (1951).
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In figurative terms, through my judicial endeavors, I live more
lives than the proverbial cat; I play more roles than the most
versatile of actors. If variety is the spice of life, as many people
think, and if you seek a spicy life, then I recommend that you
get yourself appointed to the federal bench.2
For example, just before I left the Blue Ridge Mountains of
Virginia, in writing an opinion in a thrilling admiralty case, I
had to speak the language, and know the ways, of the men who
go down to the sea in ships. Even further, in a violent storm on
the broad reaches of the Atlantic, I went down in the bowels of
the ship, into the engine room. In another admiralty case, with
all ship's lights blacked out during World War II, I was (as we
lawyers say) pro hac vice Captain of the United States Battle-
ship New Mexico, which ran down and sank, off Nantucket
Island, a $9,000,000 cargo ship, and drowned over thirty men of
her crew.
Figuratively speaking, I have been a yardmaster directing
freight trains in one of the busiest railroad yards in America;
I have been at the wheel of automobiles which killed scores of
persons; I have successfully performed the most delicate surgical
operations, though in two cases I sewed up sponges in my pa-
tients, with disastrous results; and as a fake minister of the
gospel I read the marriage service for a fake bride and a fake
groom. As a crooked trainer who doped a race-horse, I was dis-
barred from a leading Eastern race-track. I even invaded the
sanctity of my lady's boudoir, when a young girl lost her eyesight
through the inept use of a depilatory, or hair destroyer. I have
figured in the most despicable of crimes, murdering innocent
victims, burning houses to collect the insurance, and robbing
national banks and post-offices. If all the prison sentences that I
28. For a splendid article, see A Judge Looks at His Job: The Rewards
and Burdens of the Bench, 36 A.B.A.J. 833, (1950) by John C. Knox,
Senior United States District Judge for the Southern District of New
York, from which I quote (at page 834) :
At the same time, the judges of the federal courts have the most
interesting jobs in the world .... The judges of our courts, in the
exercise of maritime jurisdiction, sail the seas and traverse the shores
of every ocean on the globe .... Sometimes we visit the laboratories
of science, and there, we learn of the innermost secrets of the
alchemists and sorcerers. Our common duty may lead us through
cesspools of iniquity and we see sights that are hard to believe. We
thus learn the depths to which humanity may sink; and yet, more
often than not, we perceive manifestations of the highest principles.
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
have imposed or affirmed were added together in years, they
would reach back beyond the time when William the Conqueror
overcame Harold at the Battle of Hastings in the Eleventh Cen-
tury. On the brighter side, I have endowed hospitals, created
trusts for needy widows and orphans, refunded taxes to citizens
who suffered at the hands of greedy tax collectors and compelled
cruel employers to re-hire employees wrongfully discharged, with
complete restitution of all back wages. You can, then, easily
believe me when I tell you that my twelve years on the federal
bench have been anything but monotonous.
Indeed, I go a bit further to state that every phase of human-
ity, every type of transaction, every branch of science and knowl-
edge, is, potentially at least, within the ken of the judge. He
must, at times, penetrate the very reserves and silences of the
human soul, the inmost thoughts of the human mind. When he
undertakes to interpret a will, the judge must look over the
shoulder of the testator (now dead) to determine just what the
testator meant in the words of his will. In construing a com-
mercial contract, the judge must enter the busy marts of trade
to inform himself of the wiles and customs of those who engage
in that trade.
To express the same thought figuratively, if there be any
boundaries to the field of judicial endeavor, it is bounded on the
North by the flights of fancy, on the East by the confines of the
imagination, on the South by the realm of the absolute and on
the West by the potentialities of the human soul.
In the face of tasks so varied, so difficult, so delicate and so
dangerous, will our judges quail? I think not. Probably the'
greatest of all baseball umpires in the big leagues was old Bill
Klem. His intuitions and decisions on the diamond were so accu-
rate as to be uncanny. When Bill, at the height of his fame, was
asked the secret of his success, he gave the cryptic reply: "I
calls 'em as I sees 'em."
Judges can do no more, provided only they strive manfully to
insure that the judicial eye be neither dimmed by legal myopia
nor blurred by juristic astigmatism. Much the same idea is beau-
tifully expressed by Rudyard Kipling in the last four lines of his
great poem "When Earth's Last Picture Is Painted":
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And only the Master shall praise us, and only the
Master shall blame;
And no one shall work for money, and no one shall
work for fame,
But each for the joy of the working, and each in
his separate star,
Shall draw the Thing as he sees it, for the God
of Things as they are.
And now, though I have never aspired to be a lyric tenor, I
should like to end this lecture on a high note. It is my fond hope
that in these United States there may issue forth a far-flung
battle-line (and I use the military metaphor advisedly) of ade-
quately trained and ethically energized judges, who will see to
it that on distant dune and faroff headland shall not sink the
legal fire. It is my fervid prayer that the ancient spirit of our
law may become incarnate at even higher and finer levels for
those judges who under that spirit crave guidance, and within
it seek light. If this hope be realized, this prayer be answered,
as I have an abiding faith must come to pass; then, indeed, our
judges, in the twin fields of truth and service, will have eternally
enriched the bench's storied fame as, by that same token, they
will have forever enhanced the spiritual heritage of our nation's
glory.
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